

310.07

AUSTRALIAN WAR RECORDS
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
8/6/69

DIAGRAM SHOWING THE ORGANIZATION OF A COMPANY SECTOR FOR THE WINTER MONTHS.

Issued with an order of the Wyttschaete Group, dated 5th Sept., 1917.

The original is marked "Secret. Not to be taken into the front line."



[CAPTURED ORDER.]

NOTES ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF POSITIONS ON THE YPRES BATTLE FRONT FOR THE COMING WINTER.

A captured order of the Wytsehaete Group, dated 5-9-17, lays down the principles on which the construction of positions should be developed in preparation for the coming winter.

The following extracts from this order show that :—

- (i). The Germans propose to substitute a trench line system of defence for the present shell-hole system.
- (ii). A dummy line of trench is included in the scheme.
- (iii). Stress is laid on the necessity of preparing all reinforced concrete shelters as machine gun emplacements.

In all other matters the principles laid down in the order issued by the 4th German Army, "The Construction of Defensive Positions" (S.S. 574), dated 30-6-17, are repeated and emphasized.

EXTRACTS.

(a) **Fire trenches** (see diagram overleaf).

"It is essential to provide a continuous fire trench, capable of defence, in the present foremost fighting line. Some 330 to 440 yards behind it, a further continuous trench, consisting of lengths of fire trench connected by narrow lateral communication trenches, will be constructed as a third fighting line (3rd trench).

"These two fighting lines will be connected in each company sector by two communication trenches. In conjunction with these, short lengths of trench of irregular form and at irregular intervals will be constructed to serve as a second fighting line (2nd trench)."

(b) **Machine gun emplacements** (see also under (d) below).

"The Group regards machine gun emplacements, when strongly constructed and suitably sited, as the most essential requisite for the defence of the whole position when fighting is resumed.

"If water is not encountered close below the surface of the ground, the isolated machine gun emplacements should be connected with the nearest trench by mined galleries or covered passages."

(c) **Dug-outs.**

"Concrete structures, which should, at the same time, all be constructed for use as machine gun emplacements, must be of low profile, and the slopes of the earth covering them must be kept flat.

"Dug-outs to accommodate more than two groups (i.e., 2 N.C.O.'s and 16 men) are open to grave objections, and should therefore be avoided.

"All shelters in the first trench, in addition to affording complete protection against the weather, should be at least splinter-proof."

(d) **Dummy works.**

"A dummy trench, with an entanglement of posts without wire, should be constructed behind the third trench.

"The identification of active machine guns must be rendered as difficult as possible by the construction of dummy emplacements."

(e) **Order of work.**

"The construction of shelters and dug-outs must be carried out at the same time throughout the whole defensive zone. The construction of machine gun emplacements in the ground between the trenches must be taken in hand at once on a particularly liberal scale."

General Staff (Intelligence),

General Headquarters,


2nd October, 1917.

[P.T.O.]

EXAMPLE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF A GERMAN SUPPORTING POINT WHEN IT IS ENDEAVOURED TO CONCEAL UNTIL REQUIRED FOR USE.

The original work executed is an approach trench and the dugout, with camouflaged entrances, the wire fences, and the shell holes for dumps of tools. During the defensive battle, the garrison completes the supporting point by the addition of trenches as shown.

VIEW OF BARBED WIRE FENCE



[X] Exits of dugouts into shell holes

○ Camouflaged shell holes for dumps of trenching tools

AD Trench dug by the garrison during the defensive battle.

PO Trench dug previously.

⊠ Emplacements for stick bomb-throwers (Granatwerfer).

* View of Barbed Wire Fence.



APPROXIMATE SCALE 1/600.

Topo.

1

310.68

S.S. 561 B.]

Ia 32662 B.

EXTRACTS "B"

from a

GERMAN DOCUMENT

Entitled

PRINCIPLES OF COMMAND IN THE DEFENSIVE
BATTLE IN POSITION WARFARE.

(Revised edition, 1st March, 1917.)

I.—INFANTRY.

Energetic steps must be taken to insist on the infantry in the line continuing their work on their position, even during the fighting. Personal inspection by all infantry commanders, and by the higher commanders, is necessary to ensure this.

By night, and especially in misty weather, for example, it will often be necessary to strengthen the garrison of the front line or to bring reserves up closer to the front line. In foggy weather, a special form of "readiness for action" must be provided for.

Gaps between defensive works are a source of danger. They must be commanded by fire from the rear and the flanks, and be kept under observation by the infantry and artillery. By night and in misty weather they should be guarded by outposts.

The main points to be considered in the stationing of all reserves are to keep them concealed, and to distribute them skilfully over the area, so as to avoid unnecessary losses. Isolated farms, copses, hollows and roads which lie in valleys, should be avoided, as experience teaches that they are always heavily shelled.

When fighting takes place in open country or in positions which afford but little cover, efforts must be made to hold the front line with weak detachments, while the rest of the force is distributed in great depth, as would be the case in a strongly constructed position.

When a hostile attack begins with prolonged intense artillery preparation by the heavy and heaviest calibres of artillery and trench mortars, the foremost trenches are speedily converted into shell-hole positions, in which infantry "nests," composed of isolated groups, are formed round the sentry posts and dug-outs, wherever these still exist.

It is essential that the men should be trained to connect up such points with each other and with the trenches in rear during pauses in the fighting, by night or during misty weather.

The influence of the company and subordinate commanders in fighting in such shell-hole positions often extends only to the men who are actually with them. In such circumstances, stout-hearted men with iron nerves form the real backbone of the defence. All commanders in the front line, senior or junior, must, however, continually endeavour to keep their men capable of offering resistance and ready to make a counter-attack, by setting a personal example of calm and courageous behaviour.

In fighting of this character, it is no longer advisable to strengthen the garrison of the fighting line and to reinforce it continually. The garrison sustains heavier losses, which are continually recurring and which, because they are unnecessary, are bad for the moral of the troops. The maintenance of the foremost positions, moreover, cannot be ensured simply by a rigid defence, combined with the reinforcement of the garrison of the front line.

To secure this object, tactics of a different character must be employed.

The garrisons of the foremost trenches must be weak, but they should not be tied rigidly to one point when they can no longer find cover and may, within certain limits, change their position in order to escape from a very intense bombardment. Experience shows that no matter how carefully the enemy directs his fire, there are points within every area allotted to a unit, in which this fire is less effective. It is, therefore, a question of observing the fall of the enemy's fire, and of avoiding the areas in which it is most intense by advancing, moving to the flanks, or falling back on the nearest supports. The best method is to advance, as this is the quickest way of escaping from the enemy's fire. In movements to the flanks or towards the rear to the nearest supports, there is some danger of the continuity of the firing line being broken, and of the enemy establishing small nests in it unobserved. Efforts must, therefore, be constantly made by the detachments in the shell holes not to lose sight of one another, and the front line must be continually under observation from the rear.

Handwritten signature or initials in a box: 5/4/24/3/1

If the enemy leaves his trenches to attack our lines, every infantryman must realize that the most certain means of repelling the attack are our own rifle fire, hand grenades and the bayonet, and that even a few machine guns will break up a hostile attack. The employment of artillery is a valuable assistance in repelling an assault, but it is not of itself sufficient to repulse a strong attack.

Every rifle and machine gun which can be brought to bear on the enemy's attack, either from the firing line or from defensive positions in the rear, must be directed against it, in addition to the annihilating and barrage fire of the artillery, trench mortars and bomb-throwers (*Grasmatenwerfer*).

If, in spite of this, the enemy succeeds in entering our trenches, the task of the artillery is to cut him off from his waves and reserves which are following him up, while enfilade and frontal fire (rifle, automatic rifle, and machine gun) is opened on the enemy who has entered our trenches, to prevent his further advance. Trench mortars and bomb-throwers, in particular, should be employed to keep the enemy under fire while he is consolidating the position, although the artillery may also take part in this, if observation can be ensured.

The difficult situation in which the enemy now finds himself must be utilized without waiting for further orders. The detachments of the trench garrison who are retiring to the flanks and to the rear, and the supports lying ready behind the foremost trenches, whose task must have been so drilled into them as to become second nature, must counter-attack immediately and recapture the front line. They must in some cases advance under hostile artillery fire. The enemy must be annihilated to the last man by the use of the hand grenade and the bayonet in hand to hand fighting.

An essential preliminary to the successful employment of these tactics is to make certain that the infantry can observe the foreground and the area between the lines.

Men detailed to guard particular points (emergency garrisons) do not take part in counter-attacks.

If the counter-attack is successful, the front line must immediately be placed once more in a state of defence, but the garrison must then be reduced to its previous strength. These tactics cause the fighting to take place not in, but *for*, the front line.

It is essential that the men should be thoroughly trained in these tactics, and that the subordinate commanders and men are given clear, precise, and detailed instructions as to what they have to do, on the spot. The utmost demands must be made on every man who takes part in the attack.

If the garrison of the foremost battle zone is unable to eject the enemy or hold him, a combined attack should be delivered with the general reserves, while the enemy is still engaged in organizing the defence of a strategic system of trenches and in fighting the local reserves for "holding" or "pinning" points, etc. Every man, who is fighting in the forward battle zone, must realize clearly that by holding out, even if he is completely surrounded, he makes it easier for the counter-attack which is certain to be delivered, and is contributing to his own relief. He must, therefore, continue to fight so long as he can use his arms.

The attack itself should be delivered in waves in extended order, assault detachments being employed at some points. The attack must be supported by the fire of machine guns pushed forward in echelon, by bomb-throwers and trench mortars, by infantry guns, as well as by the artillery farther in rear. The success of the attack depends, not on the strength of the forces engaged in it, but on the resolution with which it is carried out, the co-operation of all arms, and rapidity of execution.

A decisive factor in the success of an attack is the selection of the right moment for the employment of the reserves posted farther in rear. It must be remembered that many requests for support from the front line are, as experience shows, either not justified by the situation or made too soon. If the reserves are alarmed and brought up prematurely, their energy is frittered away and the subordinate commanders are tempted to hold the front line with too large a force.

If an immediate attack does not succeed in ejecting or annihilating the enemy who has entered the position, this can only be retaken by a methodical attack.

Retreats.—The frequent retreat of the infantry is undesirable from the point of view both of command and of the troops themselves, as the change prevents the troops becoming familiar with the position and diminishes their keenness in working to improve it.

Experience shows that confusion often arises while the relief is being carried out, and ground is lost in consequence.

Precautions must be taken in advance, to ensure that there are other communications, which have been recognized and clearly marked out, to replace routes which have been discovered by the enemy and are blocked by his fire.

II.—ARTILLERY.

Searching and sweeping fire (unless it can be kept within narrow limits) by working with the assistance of suitable registration points situated close to the target, combined with an exact study of the fire with H.E. shells against groups of the enemy's guns are, as a rule, useless. On the other hand, searching and sweeping fire with gas shells may be very useful to put artillery out of action for the time being. Gas shells are not suitable for counter-battery work which aims at the destruction of the hostile battery.

When the trenches are separated by medium distances (about 165—200 yards), barrage fire should fall on and close in front of the enemy's foremost trenches, as otherwise the safety of our own trench garrison, which is not to be jeopardised on any account, cannot be ensured. If the enemy's jumping off trenches are so close to our own lines that barrage fire would endanger our own infantry, it must be left to the trench mortars and infantry to keep them under fire. The artillery barrage fire should then be directed against the enemy's rearward positions. In order to cut off his foremost waves of assault from their supports, and to catch the latter while they are concentrating. If the enemy's foremost trenches are farther from our lines (i.e., more than 350 yards), the barrage fire must follow the progress of the enemy's attack.

Artillery action against the enemy's tanks is of particular importance in the repulse of an attack, in view of the novelty of the weapon and the small amount of experience so far gained.

Destructive and barrage fire, which is directed against hollows, roads and the enemy's positions, will probably often stop tanks by its very intensity, so that only a few will reach or penetrate our lines.

Artillery action against these will be carried out by infantry guns and close-range guns which fire with direct laying at short ranges. They are equipped with a special projectile for this purpose. It is important that these guns should not open fire too soon, so that they remain concealed and are still in action when they are needed.

In addition to these guns, heavy howitzer batteries should be detailed to engage tanks. They will have particular zones allotted to them as targets, i.e., as a rule, strips of ground close in front of our lines which they can keep under observation, and on which they must register when conditions are quiet. If a tank enters the zone allotted to a battery, all the guns should be turned on the tank and salvos should be fired until it is out of action.

Nothing but a thoroughly organized bombardment such as this will be successful against tanks. General orders that all batteries which observe tanks approaching are to open fire on them only lead to confusion and failure.

In exceptional cases, heavy flat-trajectory guns, firing with direct laying and direct observation, may prove effective, for example, if tanks have broken through our lines.

Artillery Commands.—The artillery allotted to Armies to reinforce them for the defensive battle should, in principle, be distributed amongst the divisions in proportion to the importance of the various divisional sectors.

Artillery should not be massed; distribution in depth causes the enemy to scatter his fire.

III.—AIR FORCES (including Anti-Aircraft Defence).

(a) It is necessary to increase the air forces very considerably—reconnaissance and artillery aeroplanes, anti-aircraft aeroplanes, captive balloons, and anti-aircraft weapons—before the actual defensive battle, as the first objective of the enemy's attack will be to secure complete mastery of the air. This must be stopped as soon as possible.

As soon as the reinforcement of the threatened front is ordered, owing to the situation having become clear and the decision to thwart the enemy's plan having been taken, the air forces and anti-aircraft weapons must be further considerably increased. Less important fronts must without hesitation be ruthlessly denuded of aeroplanes, balloons and anti-aircraft weapons.

IV.—PIEONERS.

(a) **PIEONERS** are on no account to be employed on tasks which the infantry is capable of performing.

(b) The Pioneer Commander of the division is also in command of the pioneer battalion of the division. The Pioneer and *Mine*serer companies, and marching light sections of the division should be under his orders, and, as a rule, the labour companies as well. The Divisional Commander will arrange for the command of the pioneer and *Mine*serer companies and search light units, which are temporarily attached to the divisions.

(c) In a defensive battle, *Mine*serer have a special task to perform in engaging tanks. Special zones in front of our lines, which they must be able to keep under observation with certainty, should be allotted to them. The Pioneer and *Mine*serer units, in the same way as to the heavy artillery. If tanks enter these zones, the *Mine*serer concerned will direct their fire on all other targets and direct it on the tanks.

GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE).

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

13th May, 1917.

598
59. BATT.
882

310, 04

AUSTRALIAN RECORDS SECTION
CLASSIFICATION 2 65
SUB-SECTION

[S.S. 485.]

Ia. 20964.

(Translation of a German Document.)

1st ARMY H.Q.,

Ia. No. 489. Secret.

ARMY HEADQUARTERS,

23rd August, 1916.

ARMY ORDER REGARDING THE EXECUTION OF COUNTER-ATTACKS.

1. On the battle front of the 1st Army, our positions consist for the most part of hurriedly constructed trenches without dug-outs. Our line, the exact position of which must invariably be known to the artillery to enable it to carry out the extremely important task of maintaining an accurate barrage fire, can for the most part, therefore, only be lightly held. The absolute necessity of holding the front line in spite of the annihilating effect of the enemy's artillery fire, can in many cases be complied with only by means of counter-attacks carried out by reserves which have been withheld.

2. The experience of the Battle of the Somme fully confirms previous experience that counter-attacks are, as a rule, successful only when they:—

(a) Originate in the bold resolve of subordinate commanders in the front line, and are carried out so rapidly that the enemy has no time to consolidate himself in the newly captured ground, especially as regards his machine guns;

(b) Are carried out after a methodical preparation.

3. As regards the leading in the recent fighting, I have formed the impression that these principles have frequently been neglected. I therefore lay special stress on the following:—

A.—IMMEDIATE COUNTER-ATTACKS ORIGINATING IN THE RESOLVE OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS.

4. For an immediate counter-attack it is necessary for reserves to be at hand in good time. They must, therefore, in spite of the enemy's fire, be brought further forward than usual. This must be effected, as soon as an approaching hostile attack is recognised, by the commanders anticipating events and moving up the rearmost reserves first, thus enabling those further forward to be closed up towards the front. That is to say, the depth in which the reserves are deployed must be reduced. The higher commanders must accurately gauge the proper moment for the reserves to be moved forward: if they are moved forward unnecessarily, the troops are deprived of their requisite amount of rest. Reserves which are moved forward too tardily arrive too late for a timely counter-attack. There must be continual observation of the direction of the enemy's fire on ordinary and special days during the battle, in order to gain such a knowledge of it that the casualties of the reserves when moving forward may be minimized. It will often be advisable to move up the reserves along the lateral limits of the zones covered by the enemy's intense bombardment; this will also effectively prepare the way for launching the counter-attack so as to take the enemy in flank.

5. Our infantry is thoroughly convinced of its superiority over the French and English in close fighting. A numerically inferior German force has, therefore, every prospect of success if it advances boldly.

Every subordinate commander, relying on the efficiency of his troops, must therefore endeavour, by means of an immediate counter-attack, to recapture any portions of the position which may be lost.

In this connection, it is especially important, by means of a continuous barrage behind the objective of the counter-attack, to prevent the enemy's reserves from coming up and taking part in the close fighting.

B.—METHODICAL COUNTER-ATTACKS.

6. When the enemy has established himself in a newly gained position, it is important first of all to obtain a clear idea of the position of our own and the enemy's troops, so that our barrage fire and fire for effect against the enemy's trenches may be properly directed. Sketches prepared by the infantry in front line, showing the position of the enemy, must be rapidly placed at the disposal of the artillery. It is the duty of every commander to consolidate the new line and to maintain absolute touch with neighbouring troops.

7. On this basis, and in accordance with the reports and proposals of subordinate commanders, the higher commanders must consider and decide whether a methodical attack should be carried out in order to regain the ground lost. When making this decision, the commander must look ahead and consider whether the objective to be gained by the attack will repay the expenditure of force necessary to ensure its success.

It frequently happens that parts of positions which have been tenaciously defended against many assaults are finally lost owing to their being situated on the forward slope or forming a salient, being thus unduly exposed to the force of the enemy's fire before the assault takes place. If such points are retaken by a methodical counter-attack, the troops are deliberately placed once more in what has already been recognised as an unfavourable position, and there is once more a risk of suffering heavy casualties and a danger, which should not be under-estimated, of again losing the position which has just been recaptured. When this is judged to be the case, the higher commander must, after coolly weighing the consequences, forbid a methodical counter-attack in spite of the importance of acquiescing in and supporting every effort on the part of the troops to regain lost ground.

8. The battle which is now in progress consumes, in the defence alone, so many troops that I am forced to issue orders that methodical counter-attacks, beyond minor ones of a purely local nature, are not to be carried out except by my orders. The Army Groups will furnish me with the necessary data on which to base my decision. These should include:—

(a) A clear statement of our own and the enemy's **situation**, based on reports from infantry, artillery, aviators, specially detailed liaison officers sent out from the higher commands, captive balloons, etc.

(b) An exact determination of the **objective**, which must be selected so that the line gained by the attack can be permanently defended without incurring heavy losses.

(c) An estimate of the **infantry force** necessary to carry out the counter-attack, inclusive of the reliefs which are generally required for the infantry after the first hostile counter-attacks against the line gained by us.

(d) A statement of the **infantry** which can be furnished by the fighting troops themselves, and of the **infantry reinforcements** which must be provided by Army Headquarters.

(e) The number of **batteries** which are available for the preparation of the attack, and the extent to which artillery reinforcements from neighbouring Army Groups, or from the Army Reserve, are considered necessary. In this connection, separate statements will be given of the number of batteries for counter-battery work, for firing on the trenches which form the objective and for creating a diversion against the enemy's trenches on either side of the objective.

The co-operation of the Artillery General at Army Headquarters can be obtained at all times for the purpose of working out the artillery details.

(f) The number of **Flammenwerfer**, **Minenwerfer** and pioneer companies.

(g) An estimate of the **quantity of ammunition** required for the attack, *inclusive* of the anticipated expenditure in warding off counter-attacks. In this connection, the number of rounds for individual batteries corresponding to their employment throughout the whole of the operation will be calculated, and a demand submitted to Army Headquarters for the quantity of ammunition required *in addition* to that already available.

(Signed) v. BELOW, GENERAL,

Commanding-in-Chief.

GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE),
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
10th October, 1916.

31050Y

G 519/5



[S.S. 485.]

Ia.20964.

(Translation of a German Document.)

1st ARMY H.Q.,
Ia. No. 489. Secret.

ARMY HEADQUARTERS,
23rd August, 1916.

ARMY ORDER REGARDING THE EXECUTION OF COUNTER-ATTACKS.

1. On the battle front of the 1st Army, our positions consist for the most part of hurriedly constructed trenches without dug-outs. Our line, the exact position of which must invariably be known to the artillery to enable it to carry out the extremely important task of maintaining an accurate barrage fire, can for the most part, therefore, only be lightly held. The absolute necessity of holding the front line in spite of the annihilating effect of the enemy's artillery fire, can in many cases be complied with only by means of counter-attacks carried out by reserves which have been withheld.

2. The experience of the Battle of the Somme fully confirms previous experience that counter-attacks are, as a rule, successful only when they:—

- (a) Originate in the bold resolve of subordinate commanders in the front line, and are carried out so rapidly that the enemy has no time to consolidate himself in the newly captured ground, especially as regards his machine guns;
- (b) Are carried out after a methodical preparation.

3. As regards the leading in the recent fighting, I have formed the impression that these principles have frequently been neglected. I therefore lay special stress on the following:—

A.—IMMEDIATE COUNTER-ATTACKS ORIGINATING IN THE RESOLVE OF SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS.

4. For an immediate counter-attack it is necessary for reserves to be at hand in good time. They must, therefore, in spite of the enemy's fire, be brought further forward than usual. This must be effected, as soon as an approaching hostile attack is recognised, by the commanders anticipating events and moving up the rearmost reserves first, thus enabling those further forward to be closed up towards the front. That is to say, the depth in which the reserves are deployed must be reduced. The higher commanders must accurately gauge the proper moment for the reserves to be moved forward: if they are moved forward unnecessarily, the troops are deprived of their requisite amount of rest. Reserves which are moved forward too tardily arrive too late for a timely counter-attack. There must be continual observation of the direction of the enemy's fire on ordinary and special days during the battle, in order to gain such a knowledge of it that the casualties of the reserves when moving forward may be minimized. It will often be advisable to move up the reserves along the lateral limits of the zones covered by the enemy's intense bombardment; this will also effectively prepare the way for launching the counter-attack so as to take the enemy in flank.

5. Our infantry is thoroughly convinced of its superiority over the French and English in close fighting. A numerically inferior German force has, therefore, every prospect of success if it advances boldly.

Every subordinate commander, relying on the efficiency of his troops, must therefore endeavour, by means of an immediate counter-attack, to recapture any portions of the position which may be lost.

In this connection, it is especially important, by means of a continuous barrage behind the objective of the counter-attack, to prevent the enemy's reserves from coming up and taking part in the close fighting.

B.—METHODICAL COUNTER-ATTACKS.

6. When the enemy has established himself in a newly gained position, it is important first of all to obtain a clear idea of the position of our own and the enemy's troops, so that our barrage fire and fire for effect against the enemy's trenches may be properly directed. Sketches prepared by the infantry in front line, showing the position of the enemy, must be rapidly placed at the disposal of the artillery. It is the duty of every commander to consolidate the new line and to maintain absolute touch with neighbouring troops.

7. On this basis, and in accordance with the reports and proposals of subordinate commanders, the higher commanders must consider and decide whether a methodical attack should be carried out in order to regain the ground lost. When making this decision, the commander must look ahead and consider whether the objective to be gained by the attack will repay the expenditure of force necessary to ensure its success.

It frequently happens that parts of positions which have been tenaciously defended against many assaults are finally lost owing to their being situated on the forward slope or forming a salient, being thus unduly exposed to the force of the enemy's fire before the assault takes place. If such points are retaken by a methodical counter-attack, the troops are deliberately placed once more in what has already been recognised as an unfavourable position, and there is once more a risk of suffering heavy casualties and a danger, which should not be underestimated, of again losing the position which has just been recaptured. When this is judged to be the case, the higher commander must, after coolly weighing the consequences, forbid a methodical counter-attack in spite of the importance of acquiescing in and supporting every effort on the part of the troops to regain lost ground.

8. The battle which is now in progress consumes, in the defence alone, so many troops that I am forced to issue orders that methodical counter-attacks, beyond minor ones of a purely local nature, are not to be carried out except by my orders. The Army Groups will furnish me with the necessary data on which to base my decision. These should include:—

(a) A clear statement of our own and the enemy's **situation**, based on reports from infantry, artillery, aviators, specially detailed liaison officers sent out from the higher commands, captive balloons, etc.

(b) An exact determination of the **objective**, which must be selected so that the line gained by the attack can be permanently defended without incurring heavy losses.

(c) An estimate of the **infantry force** necessary to carry out the counter-attack, inclusive of the reliefs which are generally required for the infantry after the first hostile counter-attacks against the line gained by us.

(d) A statement of the infantry which can be furnished by the fighting troops themselves, and of the **infantry reinforcements** which must be provided by Army Headquarters.

(e) The number of **batteries** which are available for the preparation of the attack, and the extent to which artillery reinforcements from neighbouring Army Groups, or from the Army Reserve, are considered necessary. In this connection, separate statements will be given of the number of batteries for counter-battery work, for firing on the trenches which form the objective and for creating a diversion against the enemy's trenches on either side of the objective.

The co-operation of the Artillery General at Army Headquarters can be obtained at all times for the purpose of working out the artillery details.

(f) The number of Flammenwerfer, Minenwerfer and pioneer companies.

(g) An estimate of the **quantity of ammunition** required for the attack, *inclusive* of the anticipated expenditure in warring off counter-attacks. In this connection, the number of rounds for individual batteries corresponding to their employment throughout the whole of the operation will be calculated, and a demand submitted to Army Headquarters for the quantity of ammunition required *in addition* to that already available.

(Signed) v. BELOW, GENERAL,

Commanding-in-Chief.

GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE),

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

10th October, 1916.



310.02.




Diagram showing the organization & defences
of a divisional sector. From cap. document.

ofa
9B.

DIAGRAM SHOWING THE ORGANIZATION & DEFENCES OF A DIVISIONAL SECTOR. Ia/32971.

(FROM A GERMAN DOCUMENT CAPTURED IN APRIL, 1917.)



GENERAL STAFF (INTELLIGENCE),
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
1st May 1917.

H.R. 1st Army Corp
9

